Two conceptions of motivating reasons, i.e., the reasons for which we act, can be found in the literature: (i) the dominant 'psychological conception', which says that motivating reasons are an agent's believing something; and (ii) the 'non-psychological' conception, the minority view, which says that they are what the agent believes -his beliefs. In this paper I outline and defend a version of the second conception of motivating reasons.
Introduction
When discussing reasons in contexts of action, philosophers tend to distinguish between 'normative' reasons (also called 'justifying'), and 'motivating' reasons (also called 'operative'). Normative reasons are the reasons why we ought to act. Motivating reasons are the reasons we actually act for. Sometimes these coincide. That is, sometimes there is a reason why A ought to do something, and A does that thing, and does it for that reason. For example, suppose I ought to eat more spinach because I need iron; and suppose I do eat more spinach and my reason for doing so is that I need iron. Here, the reason for which I act (motivating) is also the reason why I ought to act (normative), namely, that I need iron.
There has been much discussion about normative reasons in the recent literature but I shall have little to say about them here. 1 My focus in this paper will be the second kind of reasons: motivating reasons -the reasons for which we act when we act for a reason. And my purpose is to clarify the nature of motivating reasons and of their relation to the explanation of action.
Two conceptions of motivating reasons are to be found in the literature. According to the dominant view, which I shall call 'the psychological conception', 2 motivating reasons are best articulated using a psychological verb: 'his reason was that he believed that p' (or 'his believing that p'), 3 and, it is often said, such reasons are mental states of the agent. The alternative, the non-psychological view, rejects the view that motivating reasons are mental states as it holds that motivating reasons are best articulated by stating what the agent believes, i.e. 'his reason was that p'. Thus, if I run home because it's raining, according to the psychological conception my reason for running is that I believe that it is raining (or my believing that it is raining); while according to the non-psychological conception my reason is that it is raining.
The significance of this disagreement is often obscured, especially for those who hold the majority view, by the fact that the psychological conception is often articulated using an 'He believes it is raining' and 'It is raining' are different reasons expressed in statements with different truth conditions. Thus, although the term 'my belief' can do duty for either notion, it cannot do duty for both at the same time, so the question indeed presses itself: which is the right conception, that which says that motivating reasons are our believing something, or that which says that they are what we believe? My answer will be that the second, the minority view, is right.
Conceptions of motivating reasons similar to the one I shall defend have been persuasively presented recently by a minority of philosophers. 4 This minority view has thus been established as a serious contender in what is really a new debate about the nature of the reasons for which we act. However, the minority view is still regarded as implausible or confused, mostly because it is not sufficiently well understood, or because it is thought to bring with it insuperable difficulties. In this paper I offer a detailed and distinctive version of that minority view. My account, I believe, overcomes the apparently insuperable difficulties associated with the minority view.
The structure of this paper is as follows. The first section is devoted to preliminary matters. Then, I shall argue for the minority conception in section 2. In sections 3 to 5 I examine and provide solutions to the difficulties associated with the minority conception of motivating reasons, difficulties that concern 'error cases' -i.e., cases where an agent acts in the light of some false belief -and the explanation of action.
Preliminaries
Before spelling out my account of motivating reasons, a few preliminary clarifications are required.
The reason why someone acted may be her reason for acting. Thus, if I eat spinach because I need iron then the reason why I eat spinach, viz that I need iron, is also my reason for eating spinach. But this need not be the case; sometimes the reason why someone acted may not be their reason for acting. For example, the reason why A gives a lot of money to charities is that A is an altruistic person. But that A is an altruistic person is not A's reason for donating money. The same is true of omissions. Thus suppose that I don't turn up to give a paper because I forget I was meant to. Again, that I forgot was not my reason for not turning up. In this paper I am primarily concerned with motivating reasons: the reasons for which we act when we act for reasons.
I also want to disregard a possible complication -I'm thinking of those cases where what the agent claims was his reason for doing something was not really his reason. For example, Albert says he went to the library because he needs to borrow a book, but in fact he went because Helen, on whom he has a crush, is at the library. His reason for going to the library was that Helen is there and not that he needs to borrow a book, as he claimed. (The discrepancy in such cases may be due either to dissimulation or to self-deception, which will depend on how good the agent is at identifying his own motives and how keen he is to conceal them.) 5 Finally, in this paper I shall leave aside the role of desires in motivation. There has been much debate concerning the relation between desires and both normative and motivating reasons, focusing on questions such as whether an agent's desires provide him with reasons for acting; whether beliefs alone can be reasons or whether every reason must comprise a belief and a desire; whether reasons are dependent on the agent's desires (internal vs external reasons); and so on. But, whatever the answers to those questions concerning desires might be, it is true that the reason for which someone acts, is (at least partly) some belief of his.
And my concern here is with understanding that -the nature of what might be called the 'cognitive' aspect of motivating reasons. 6 So, for the moment, I put desires aside. The problem here is that I cannot, without an air of paradox, say something like: 'My reason for giving him the money is that he needs it, although he doesn't'; or 'I'm giving him the money because he needs it, although he doesn't'. These statements are reminiscent of Moore's paradoxes of belief. However, unlike Moore's paradoxes, these statements remain paradoxical when turned into the third-person: 'Her reason for giving him the money is that he needs it, although he doesn't'; or 'She's giving him the money because he needs it, although he doesn't'. 12 And again, unlike Moore's cases, these remain paradoxical, although perhaps to a lesser extent, when they are put in the past tense. Thus compare 'I gave him the money because he needed it, although he didn't need it' and 'I believed that he was ill, although he wasn't'.
Motivating Reasons
The problem with these expressions is not that it is impossible to think of a context where they might be appropriately used, but that their use would always involve a note of irony that subverts the claim about the alleged reason. And if we want to avoid the air of paradox or irony, we tend to specify what motivated the agent by using a different form of words; typically, we use a locution involving psychological verbs such as 'believe'. That is, we tend say something like 'What motivated her was her belief that he needed the money (though he didn't need it)', 'Her reason was that she believed he needed the money (although he didn't)'; or 'I gave him the money because I believed he needed money (although he didn't)', etc.
But now it seems that, after all, the psychological conception of motivating reasons is right; or, at any rate, right for error cases. This is the claim I examine in the next section.
Beliefs as Motivating Reasons
In this section I shall focus on statements of reason that appear to support the psychological conception such as 'What motivated her was her belief that p', or 'Her reason is her belief that p', and will leave expressions such as 'She did it because she believed that p' for the next section. Here I shall argue that the fact that in some cases we resort to locutions such as 'Her reason was her belief that p' in order to avoid the air of paradox, does not show that the psychological conception is right, not even for error cases. Let me explain why not.
Earlier in the paper, in the Introduction, I drew attention to the distinction between two uses of the term 'belief', namely, to denote my believing something and to denote what I believe. I return to that distinction now to show that it is only the conflation of those two uses that might make the claim that motivating reasons are our beliefs seem a vindication of the psychological view. For such a vindication would require that we use 'her belief' in the first sense noted above (her believing The thought that there is a problem here must arise from a peculiar conception of what it is for something someone believes to motivate them. In order to motivate someone, a thinkable must be believed and it must appear to the agent to speak in favour of acting in a certain way. Thus, in order to motivate me to take my umbrella, the thinkable 'It is raining' must be something that I believe and that I take to speak in favour of taking an umbrella. A false belief is a false thinkable that the agent believes to be true. The fact that the agent takes it to be true explains why a false belief can still motivate him to act: if I falsely believe that is true, my false belief might well make taking my umbrella seem the right thing to do. The fact that my belief is false does not deprive it of its capacity to motivate.
It is true that a belief that motivates someone to act can only justify his so acting if the belief is true -that is, if the agent is motivated by a reason. 14 And it is true that, therefore, false motivating beliefs cannot justify an action. But this does not mean that they cannot motivate an agent to act.
In the following section I explore the relation between motivating reasons and explanations of action. In it, I shall explain why and when we use psychological locutions of the second kind mentioned above, i.e. 'He did it because he believed that p'. And, in the process of doing that, I shall show why the use of these locutions does not support the psychological conception of motivating reasons either.
Motivating Reasons and the Explanation of Action
It is possible to explain an action by indicating what it was that motivated the agent to act. prefixed by the phrase 'she believed that', but without implying either that it was a reason or that it wasn't (though they carry a suggestion that it wasn't.) Indeed, since it is possible to construct psychological explanations both in veridical and in error cases, we could say that there are psychological-reason explanations and psychological apparent-reason explanations.
In the first, what follows the 'she believed that' is true and hence a reason, in the second it is false.
It should be noted that while it is possible to construct psychological explanations both in veridical and in error cases, proper reasons explanations are available only in veridical cases. And it is precisely the fact that in error cases we have to use these psychological explanations that has proved one of the most resilient grounds of support for the psychological conception of motivating reasons. But, as I shall show, this support for the psychological conception is actually rather shaky.
These explanations are taken to support the psychological conception of motivating reasons because it is believed that the explanans of a psychological explanation (namely, 'she believed that p') is also the reason that motivated the agent. But this is wrong on two counts. The first aspect of the use of psychological explanations we have seen already: an explanation such as 'She lent him the money because she believed he was in need' identifies the motivating belief. This is something that a reason explanation can also do but, as we have seen, when the belief was false, we need to resort to some kind of psychological locution.
Moreover, and relatedly, these psychological explanations can be used by the speaker providing the explanation to control the strict implications or the conversational implicatures of the explanation and, in doing so, the speaker can also convey his or her own views about And this brings out the third feature of the role of these psychological explanations, which is that they allow the speaker to specify the precise epistemic attitude of the agent towards what motivated her (see note 6). Thus, whereas the reason explanation 'She left because the concert had finished' implies that the agent was, in one way or another, epistemically related to the fact that the concert had finished, the psychological locution permits the speaker to specify precisely what this epistemic relation was: 'She left because she knew / believed / suspected / deduced / etc… , that the concert had finished'.
We have seen, then, the role that psychological explanations can play. And the question of when we use them has been implicitly answered: this is a matter of the pragmatics of explanation, of what is appropriate in the context, given the logical implications and the conversational implicatures that explanations of each kind have. Thus, depending on whether the speaker wishes to (or can, epistemically speaking) endorse or not the statement that captures the motivating belief, and depending on how much detail is appropriate, he'll use a reason explanation or a psychological explanation. 17 But whichever form is used, it is still the case that what motivates agents is what they believe, not the fact that they believe it, or their believing it. In short, the fact that we may and sometimes must use these psychological locutions does not support the psychological conception of motivating reasons.
Before finishing this paper I should like to make a point of clarification about the character of explanations of action, and in particular about the 'facticity' of explanations.
This is the topic of the following section.
The Facticity of Explanations of Action
The conception of motivating reasons I have defended here is similar to one that has been is not so, as we can explain the use of those expressions and the roles they play without commitment to the psychological conception.
One of the questions that occupied philosophers of action in the second half of the twentieth century was whether the reason for which someone acts is the cause of her action, as well as the related but distinct question whether explanations of action that cite an agent's reason are causal explanations. It is probably true to say that the majority of philosophers today believe that the answer to those questions is yes -although it is also true that the number of the dissenting minority has been growing in recent years. However, that debate was mostly conducted on the assumption that the psychological conception of motivating reasons is right. Therefore it would seem that, if the minority view of motivating reasons that I have defended in this paper is right, the causalist debate in the theory of action needs to be thought afresh.
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